Abstract
In the July/August issue of Intereconomics, Ilona Sologoub argued that increasing the cost of war would limit the ability of an authoritarian state to wage a war. Here, Charles D. Coleman comments on this statement and offers clarification, followed by a reply from Sologoub.
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References
Chapkovski, P. and M. Schaub (2022), Solid Support or Secret Dissent? A List Experiment on Preference Falsification during the Russian War against Ukraine, Research & Politics, April–June.
Coleman, C. (2002), Why Don’t Democracies Go to War?.
Kuran, T. (1995), The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises, American Journal of Sociology, 100(6), 1528–1551.
Sologoub, I. (2022), Ukraine’s EU Integration: A Long Way Home, Intereconomics, 57(4), 218–224.
References
Corbet, J. and A. Gummich (1990), The Soviet Union at the Crossroads: Facts and Figures on the Soviet Republics, Deutsche Bank.
Focus (2022, 26 August), Росіяни написали 145 тисяч доносів уРоскомнагляд усього за пів року, https://focus.ua/uk/world/526897-rosiyane-napisali-145-tisyach-donosov-v-roskomnadzor-vse-za-polgoda (26 September 2022).
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Charles D. Coleman, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington DC, USA.
Ilona Sologoub, VoxUkraine, Kyiv, Ukraine.
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Open Access: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Open Access funding provided by ZBW — Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.