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Intereconomics

, Volume 54, Issue 4, pp 201–208 | Cite as

Competition and Competition Policy in a Data-Driven Economy

  • Justus HaucapEmail author
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Abstract

Data has become a crucial resource to increase firms' efficiency in product design, production, distribution, marketing and virtually all parts of the value chain. From a competition policy perspective, however, the question emerges whether a firm's data ‘treasure’ can be the source of competitive advantage that make sit very unlikely or even impossible for other firms to catch up in the foresee able future.

While digital platforms have injected competition into manymarkets, there is also an increased risk of market foreclosureby large platforms due to the tippy ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of these markets.

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Copyright information

© ZBW and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)Heinrich-Heine-Universitaet DuesseldorfDüsseldorfGermany

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