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Risk Reduction, Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard: A Vaccination Metaphor

Abstract

This paper focuses on unemployment insurance; it sketches the rationale for a degree of centralisation that would create a lean insurance union, addressing the risk of large economic shocks.

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Correspondence to Frank Vandenbroucke.

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This paper elaborates on a section of a forthcoming ECFIN Discussion Paper titled Structural convergence versus systems completion: limits to the diversity in the European Economic and Monetary Union; the research was funded by the ECFIN Fellowship Initiative 2016-2017.

Frank Vandenbroucke, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

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Vandenbroucke, F. Risk Reduction, Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard: A Vaccination Metaphor. Intereconomics 52, 154–159 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-017-0665-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-017-0665-8