Abstract
This paper seeks to highlight the links and discrepancies between three contemporary theoretical fields. The first part is devoted to theories of mind and personal epistemology. Both fields deal with naïve theories relating to the nature of knowledge and can be integrated within the concept of folk epistemology (Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89–105, 2002). We argue that analyzing both domains from a developmental perspective may provide evidence for the origins of epistemological beliefs and the reasons for their evolution. The second part of the paper extends the discussion to the concept of metacognition and to its potential links with the two previously mentioned fields. In the past, theories of mind and metacognition have mainly developed as independent fields, but recent studies have highlighted a possible developmental lineage between them that needs further investigation. As the influence of the procedural component of metacognition (the regulation process) seems obvious in the personal epistemology perspective, we suggest that conducting more in situ studies will enable us to deepen our understanding of the links between the multiple components of the epistemological perspective and the reasons for epistemic change.
Résumé
Cet article vise à éclairer les liens et divergences possibles entre trois courants théoriques contemporains. La première partie est consacrée aux théories de l’esprit et à l’épistémologie personnelle. Les deux courants s’intéressent aux théories naïves relatives à la connaissance et peuvent être intégrés sous le concept d’épistémologie populaire (folk epistemology, Kitchener New Ideas Psychol 20:89–105, 2002). Nous défendons l’idée selon laquelle analyser les deux domaines dans une perspective développementale permet de mieux cerner les origines des croyances épistémiques et les raisons de leur évolution. La deuxième partie de l’article étend la discussion au concept de métacognition et envisage de possibles liaisons avec les deux champs susmentionnés. Par le passé, les théories de l’esprit et la métacognition se sont développées essentiellement comme des champs de recherche indépendants. Des études récentes ont permis d’éclairer une possible continuité développementale entre ces champs, ouvrant dès lors la voie à de nouvelles investigations. Dans la mesure où la composante procédurale de la métacognition (le processus de régulation) semble assez clairement présente dans le champ de l’épistémologie personnelle, nous suggérons de conduire davantage de recherche in situ en vue d’approfondir notre compréhension des liens entre les multiples composantes de la perspective épistémologique ainsi que des éléments explicatifs des changements épistémiques.
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Annick Fagnant. Departement Education et Formation, Faculté de Pyschologie et des Sciences de l’Education, B32—Boulevard du Rectorat, 5, Université de Liège, 4000 Sart-Tilman—Belgique. E-mail: afagnant@ulg.ac.be; Web site: http://www.ulg.ac.be/
Current themes of research:
Mathematical problem solving (mainly in primary school). Large scale studies (PISA) and standardized evaluation. Teacher’s beliefs (personal epistemology, beliefs about learning,…).
Most relevant publications in the field of Psychology of Education:
Fagnant, A. (2009). Teacher’s role, mathematical discourse between children and evolution of the first symbolizations: An analysis of a mathematical learning activity. In A. Gomes (Ed.), Elementary Mathematics Education—Proceedings of the 3rd Meeting/Matemática Elementar—Actas do 3. º Encontro. Braga (Novembre 2008): AEME/IEC-UM, pp. 151–160.
Fagnant, A., & Burton, R. (2009). Développement de compétences et résolution de problèmes en mathématiques à l’école primaire : pratiques déclarées des enseignants et pratiques projetées des futurs enseignants. Scientia Paedagogica Experimentalis, 46(2), 293–318.
Goffin, C., Fagnant, A., & Blondin, C. (2009). Des langues très appréciées: les langues du voisin? LIDIL. Revue de Linguistique et de Didactique des Langues, 40, 17–30.
Crahay, M. & Fagnant, A. (2007). A propos de l’épistémologie personnelle: un état des recherches anglo-saxonnes. Revue Française de Pédagogie, 161, 79–117.
Fagnant, A. (2005). The use of mathematical symbolism in problem solving. An empirical study carried out in grade one in the French Community of Belgium. European Journal of Psychology of Education, XX (4), pp. 355–367.
Marcel Crahay. Développement, apprentissage et intervention en situations scolaires, Faculté de Pyschologie et des Sciences de l’Education, Université de Genève, Bd du Pont d'Arve, 40, (Bureau 3368), 1205 Genève, 3. E-mail: marcel.crahay@unige.ch; Web site: http://www.unige.ch/
Current themes of research:
Teacher’s beliefs (personal epistemology, beliefs about learning,…). Teacher’s beliefs, teacher’s planning and teaching practice. Teacher’s beliefs and school learning, school success and failure. Teacher’s beliefs and pupils motivation.
Most relevant publications in the field of Psychology of Education:
Chappelle, G. & Crahay, M. (Ed.) (2009). Réussir à apprendre. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Marcoux, G. & Crahay., M. (2008). Mais pourquoi continuent-ils à faire redoubler? Essai de compréhension du jugement des enseignants. Revue des Sciences de l’éducation, 30(3), 501–518.
Crahay, M. (2006). E possível tirar conclusões sobre os efeitos da repetência? Revisita Cadernos de Pesquisa, v. 36, n. 127, p. 223–246, jan./abr. (traduction de l’article Peut-on conclure à propos des effets du redoublement, publié dans la Revue Française de Pédagogie.
Crahay, M. (2006). Dangers, incertitudes et incomplétudes de la logique de la compétence. Revue française de pédagogie, 154, 97–110.
Crahay, M. (2005). Psychologie de l’éducation. (Quadrige). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
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Fagnant, A., Crahay, M. Theories of mind and personal epistemology: their interrelation and connection with the concept of metacognition. Eur J Psychol Educ 26, 257–271 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10212-010-0045-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10212-010-0045-2
