International Journal of Information Security

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 169–186 | Cite as

Multi-operator wireless mesh networks secured by an all-encompassing security architecture

Special Issue Paper
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Abstract

Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) consist of a wirelessly connected infrastructure of Mesh Routers (MRs) connected to the Internet via Mesh Gateways. Previous proposals on WMN security mainly focus on mesh networks operated by a single operator and rarely support mobility of Mesh Clients (MCs) with the help of secure roaming and handover procedures. While these approaches protect the communication of MCs against external attackers, they do not take internal attackers into account. In our previous work, we proposed a security architecture for single-operator WMNs, extended this architecture to the multi-operator case to support roaming between operators and secure infrastructure sharing and proposed secure handover procedures within the domain of a single operator. In this paper, we merge the different aspects of our prior proposals together to form a comprehensive security architecture for multi-operator WMNs. Our solution is based on open standards and explicitly addresses internal attackers. In addition, we propose pro-active handover services between different operators and show how dedicated MRs can take over authentication services in time-critical situations such as handover procedures.

Keywords

Wireless Mesh Networks Security  Key management  Multi-operator Handover 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.RWTH Aachen UniversityAachenGermany

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