International Journal of Information Security

, Volume 13, Issue 5, pp 453–465

Provable security of a pairing-free one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol for wireless sensor networks

Regular Contribution

DOI: 10.1007/s10207-013-0224-7

Cite this article as:
Yasmin, R., Ritter, E. & Wang, G. Int. J. Inf. Secur. (2014) 13: 453. doi:10.1007/s10207-013-0224-7
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Abstract

Designing efficient as well as secure cryptographic protocols for resource-constrained applications is a challenging task. In this paper, we formally analyze the security of an efficient one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol, the 1P-AKE protocol, which is primarily proposed for resource-constrained sensor nodes devices in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In contrast to the existing identity-based one-pass key establishment protocols, the 1P-AKE protocol does not require any bilinear pairing computation in order to establish a key. This feature makes it really attractive for resource-constrained application environments, such as WSNs, where pairing computations are too expensive. We show that in the random oracle model, the 1P-AKE protocol is a secure authenticated one-pass key establishment protocol under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption. The performance of the 1P-AKE protocol is also discussed and compared with the existing relevant protocols.

Keywords

One-pass key establishment ID-based key establishment  Authenticated key establishment Pairing-free Provable security 

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK
  2. 2.Huawei International Pte Ltd20 Science Park RoadSingaporeSingapore

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