Cognition, Technology & Work

, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp 207–212 | Cite as

Cognitive engineering and the moral theology and witchcraft of cause

Original Article


In keeping with the concerns of this special issue—while extending its empirical reach—we consider the influence that some fundamental ideas of Western society have had on how we look at failure and accountability in complex systems. We suggest that these may have gone somewhat unnoticed or been neglected by cognitive systems engineering and that this could undermine its agenda.


Cause Blame Human error Cognitive engineering Criminalization 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Griffith UniversityBrisbaneAustralia
  2. 2.Ball State UniversityMuncieUSA

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