Abstract
We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suffer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how parties may exploit this effect to their interest. We characterize the strong perfect equilibria of the game and show that, in equilibrium, the social network determines which party wins the election. We also show that to dispose of the citizens better connected in the network with the other faction is not a guarantee to win the election.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aumann RJ (1959) Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games. In: Tucker AW, Luce RD (eds) Contributions to the theory of games IV, Annals of Mathematics Study, vol 40. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Bernheim BD, Peleg B, Whinston MD (1987) Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I. Concepts. J Econ Theory 42(1): 1–12
Brusco S (1997) Implementing action profiles when agents collude. J Econ Theory 73(2): 395–424
Campbell A, Converse PE, Miller WE, Stokes DE (1960) The American Voter. Wiley, New York
Dekel E, Jackson MO, Wolinsky A (2008) Vote buying. I. General elections. Forthcomming in the Journal of Political Economy
Feddersen TJ (2004) Rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting. J Econ Perspect 18(1): 99–112
Fowler JH (2005) Turnout in a small world. In: Zuckerman AS (eds) The social logic of politics. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA
Groseclose T, Snyder JM Jr (1996) Buying supermajorities. Am Pol Sci Rev 90(2): 303–315
Herrera H, Martinelli C (2006) Group formation and voter participation. Theor Econ 1(4): 461–487
Lazarsfeld PF, Berelson B, Gaudet H (1944) The people’s choice. Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York
Ledyard JO (1981) The paradox of voting and candidate competition: a general equilibrium analysis. In: Hoorwich G, Quick JP (eds) Essays in contemporary fields of economics. Purdue University Press, Lafayette
Ledyard JO (1984) The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice 44(1): 7–41
Morton RB (1991) Groups in rational turnout models. Am J Pol Sci 35(3): 758–776
Mutz DC (2002) The consequences of cross-cutting networks for political participatino. Am J Pol Sci 46(4): 838–855
Mutz DC (2006) Hearing the other side. deliverative versus participatory democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York
Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1983) A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice 41(1): 7–53
Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1985) Voter participation and strategic uncertainty. Am Pol Sci Rev 79(1): 62–78
Riker WH, Ordeshook PC (1968) A theory of the calculus of voting. Am Pol Sci Rev 62(1): 25–42
Rubinstein A (1979) Strong perfect equilibrium in super games. Int J Game Theory 9(1): 1–12
Shachar R, Nalebuff B (1999) Follow the leader: theory and evidence on political participation. Am Econ Rev 89(3): 525–547
Simmel G (1955) Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation. Free Press, New York. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix
Uhlaner CJ (1989) Rational turnout: the neglected role of groups. Am J Polit Sci 33(2): 390–422
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Andina-Díaz, A., Meléndez-Jiménez, M.A. Voting in small networks with cross-pressure. Span Econ Rev 11, 99–124 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-008-9044-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-008-9044-8