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Games of strategic complementarities: an application to Bayesian games

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Spanish Economic Review

Abstract

This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities, considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Avenida Pearson, 21, Barcelona, 08034, Spain

    Xavier Vives

  2. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

    Xavier Vives

Authors
  1. Xavier Vives
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Correspondence to Xavier Vives.

Additional information

This paper is based on the Spanish Economic Review lecture given at the Simposio de Análisis Económico, Alicante, December 2001. Support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (project SEJ2005-08263) is gratefully acknowledged.

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Vives, X. Games of strategic complementarities: an application to Bayesian games. SpanEconRev 9, 237–247 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-007-9027-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-007-9027-1

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