Abstract
We use the Marimon and Zilibotti (Econ J 109: 266–291, 1999) circle model and we endogenize the choice of the degree of specialization of jobs. We show that an increase in unemployment benefits not only reduces the mismatch of talents (as in Marimon and Zilibotti), but it also raises the degree of specialization of jobs. This reinforces the productivity enhancing effects of unemployment benefits.
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Amine, S., Gavrel, F. & Lebon, I. Jobs specialization versus unemployment: more on the productivity effect of unemployment benefits. SpanEconRev 9, 177–191 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-006-9022-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-006-9022-y