Abstract.
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.
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JEL Classification:
J41, J50, J52
We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Community’s program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.
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Mauleon, A., Vannetelbosch, V.J. Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information. Spanish Economic Review 5, 307–316 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-003-0069-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-003-0069-8