Abstract
We present a non-pricing allocation scheme of divisible goods to agents with utility functions and submodular constraints on goods. The main contribution of the present paper is that through our non-pricing allocation scheme we reveal the close relation between (1) the recent results in the allocation schemes of the random assignment problem and its extensions with ordinal or lexicographic preferences on goods and (2) the monotone algorithms of fair (egalitarian) allocations with separable utility functions and submodular constraints investigated a few decades ago. The underlying submodularity structure plays a crucial rôle, so that the probabilistic serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin and other related mechanisms can naturally be extended to problems with submodular constraints.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
It should, however, be noted that the advantage of the random assignment problem with the probabilistic serial mechanism is that we need only agents’ preferences but not their utility functions which are expensive or hard to identify in practice.
References
Bochet, O., İlkılıç, R., Moulin, H.: Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. J. Econ. Theory 148, 535–562 (2013)
Bochet, O., İlkılıç, R., Moulin, H., Sethuraman, J.: Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. Theor. Econ. 7, 395–423 (2012)
Bogomolnaia, A.: Random assignment: redefining the serial rule. J. Econ. Theory 158, 308–318 (2015)
Bogomolnaia, A., Heo, E.J.: Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule. J. Econ. Theory 147, 2072–2082 (2012)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H.: A new solution to the random assignment problem. J. Econ. Theory 100, 295–328 (2001)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H.: Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econometrica 72, 257–279 (2004)
Budish, E., Che, Y.-K., Kojima, F., Milgrom, P.: Designing random allocation mechanisms: theory and applications. Am. Econ. Rev. 103, 585–623 (2013)
Chandramouli, S., Sethuraman, J.: Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems. Math. Soc. Sci. 90, 111–118 (2017)
Che, Y.-K., Kim, J., Mierendorff, K.: Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach. Econometrica 81, 2487–2520 (2013)
Dutta, B., Ray, D.: A concept of egalitarianism under participation constraints. Econometrica 57, 615–635 (1989)
Edmonds, J.: Submodular functions, matroids, and certain polyhedra. In: Proceedings of the Calgary International Conference on Combinatorial Structures and Their Applications (R. Guy, H. Hanani, N. Sauer and J. Schönheim, eds., Gordon and Breach, New York), pp. 69–87 (1970)
Ekici, Ö., Kesten, O.: An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism. Int. J. Game Theory 45, 655–674 (2016)
Flores-Szwagrzak, K.: The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences. Soc. Choice Welfare 47, 763–789 (2016)
Flores-Szwagrzak, K.: Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints. Soc. Choice Welfare 48, 109–131 (2017)
Fujishige, S.: Algorithms for solving the independent-flow problems. J. Oper. Res. Soc. Jpn. 21, 189–204 (1978)
Fujishige, S.: Lexicographically optimal base of a polymatroid with respect to a weight vector. Math. Oper. Res. 2, 186–196 (1980)
Fujishige, S.: Submodular Functions and Optimization, 2nd edn. Elsevier, Amsterdam (2005)
Fujishige, S., Sano, Y., and Zhan, P.: A solution to the random assignment problem with a matroidal family of goods. RIMS Preprint RIMS-1852, Kyoto University, May (2016)
Fujishige, S., Sano, Y., Zhan, P.: An extended probabilistic serial mechanism to the random assignment problem with multi-unit demands and polymatroidal supplies. RIMS Preprint RIMS-1866, Kyoto University, November (2016)
Fujishige, S., Sano, Y., Zhan, P.: The random assignment problem with submodular constraints on goods. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 6(1), 28 (2018)
Gallo, G., Grigoriadis, M.D., Tarjan, R.E.: A fast parametric maximum flow algorithm and applications. SIAM J. Comput. 18, 30–55 (1989)
Groenevelt, H.: Two algorithms for maximizing a separable concave function over a polymatroid feasible region. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 54, 227–236 (1991)
Hashimoto, T., Hirata, D., Kesten, O., Kurino, M., Ünver, M.U.: Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism. Theor. Econ. 9, 253–277 (2014)
Heo, E.J.: Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization. J. Math. Econ. 54, 40–47 (2014)
Hokari, T.: Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solution on convex games. Soc. Choice Welfare 19, 825–844 (2002)
Hokari, T., van Gellekom, A.: Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: some logical relations. Int. J. Game Theory 31, 593–607 (2002)
Katta, A.-K., Sethuraman, J.: A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain. J. Econ. Theory 131, 231–250 (2006)
Kojima, F.: Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. Math. Soc. Sci. 57, 134–142 (2009)
Kojima, F., Manea, M.: Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism. J. Econ. Theory 145, 106–123 (2010)
Megiddo, N.: Optimal flows in networks with multiple sources and sinks. Math. Program. 7, 97–107 (1974)
Moulin, H.: Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing. J. Econ. Theory 162, 1–20 (2016)
Moulin, H.: Consistent bilateral assignment. Math. Soc. Sci. 90, 43–55 (2017)
Moulin, H.: One-dimensional mechanism design. Theor. Econ. 12, 587–619 (2017)
Moulin, H., Sethuraman, J.: The bipartite rationing problem. Oper. Res. 61, 1087–1100 (2013)
Murota, K.: Discrete Convex Analysis (SIAM Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications 10, SIAM) (2003)
Murota, K.: Discrete convex analysis: a tool for economics and game theory. J. Mech. Inst. Des. 1, 151–273 (2016)
Murota, K., Shioura, A.: M-convex function on generalized polymatroid. Math. Oper. Res. 24, 95–105 (1999)
Saban, D., Sethuraman, J.: A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences. J. Math. Econ. 50, 283–289 (2014)
Shioura, A., Tamura, A.: Gross substitutes condition and discrete concavity for multi-unit valuations: a survey. J. Oper. Res. Soc. Jpn. 58, 61–103 (2015)
Schulman, L.J., Vazirani, V.V.: Allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic preferences. In: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (35th IARCS Annual Conf. Foundation of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS)) (Eds., P. Harsha and G. Ramalingam), pp. 543–559 (2015)
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful to Britta Peis for communications and useful discussions about the subject of this paper, which motivated our present work and improved the presentation. We also appreciate useful comments of an anonymous referee.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
S. Fujishige’s work is supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP25280004 and JP26280001 and Y. Sano’s work by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP15K20885 and JP16H03118.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Fujishige, S., Sano, Y. & Zhan, P. Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem. Math. Program. 178, 485–501 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1310-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1310-4
Keywords
- Random assignment problem
- Submodular optimization
- Independent flows
- Submodular flows
- Non-pricing allocation
- Probabilistic serial mechanism