Economics of Governance

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 143–160 | Cite as

Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility

  • Günther G. Schulze
  • Björn Frank
Original Paper


This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a ‘payment satisfaction’ effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.

Key words: Corruption, gender, intrinsic motivation, monitoring 
JEL classification: C91, D82 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Günther G. Schulze
    • 1
  • Björn Frank
    • 2
  1. 1.Universität Freiburg, Institut für Allgemeine Wirtschaftsforschung, Platz der Alten Synagoge 1, 79085 Freiburg, Germany DE
  2. 2.German Institute for Economic Research, DIW, Königin-Luise-Str. 5, 14195 Berlin, Germany (e-mail: DE

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