Abstract.
We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a second-best framework and explore how the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the relative evaluation of the two types of public goods.
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Received: August 20, 1998/accepted: February 12, 2002
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ID="*" We are grateful to John Quigley, Minoru Kunisaki, Tom Panella, Andy Haughwout, Steven Craig, William Hoyt, Michael Ash, Konrad Stahl, Amihai Glazer, David Wildasin and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions, An early version of this paper was presented at a seminar at University of California, Berkeley and at conferences at JAEE Annual Meeting in Japan, North American Meetings of The RSAI in Washington, WSAI conference in Hawaii, Public Choice Meeting in San Francisco.
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Akai, N., Ihori, T. Central government subsidies to local public goods. Econ Gov 3, 227–239 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s101010200048
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s101010200048