Abstract.
Assuming a risk of innocent conviction and fully rational individuals, the current study addresses the effects of immediate punishment and probation rules. Strict dominance of a probation rule requires that the judicial system is highly unreliable and, at the same time, learning over criminal careers is strong. Else, an optimal punishment scheme can always be based on either regularly offering probation or appropriate immediate punishments.
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Received: July 2000 / Accepted: November 2001
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ID="*" The authors gratefully acknowledge valuable comments by three anonymous referees and the US co-editor of the journal.
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Fabel, O., Meier, V. Rational probation decisions for juvenile delinquents. Econ Gov 3, 249–274 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s101010100044
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s101010100044