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A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors

  • Roger D. CongletonEmail author
  • Yang Zhou
Original Paper

Abstract

The governorships of Jesse Ventura of Minnesota and Arnold Schwarzenegger of California provide two natural experiments for testing the institutionally induced stability hypothesis. Both men rose to their governorships through unique career and electoral paths that would reduce the stabilizing effects of partisan commitments and electoral competition, which would tend to increase their impact on public policy. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests that despite their unique backgrounds and paths to office neither governor had a statistically significant impact on their state’s expenditures or deficits.

Keywords

Government experience Natural experiment Outsidership Governor Fiscal policy Minnesota Jesse Ventura California Arnold Schwarzenegger 

JEL Classifications

H71 H72 H77 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWest Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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