Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Economics of Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study integrates some of the seminal public choice research on clubs and recent research on prison gangs into an analysis of the formation of surf gangs. More specifically, this study presents a model examining how surf break congestion, localism effort, and surfing camaraderie work to determine the optimal size of a local surf gang. The benefits of surfing in groups fall under the heading of camaraderie, and their presence means that the optimal surf gang size is bounded away from one. The benefits of camaraderie in surfing will likely be exhausted at small numbers owing to crowding of the surf break.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Courtesy of Los Angeles Times

Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Kvinta (2013) indicates that 64% (36%) of all U.S. surfers are male (female). These percentages translate to about 2.1 million (1.2 million) male surfers (female surfers) in the U.S.

  2. See waveloch.com.

  3. See also waveloch.com. Kvinta (2013) offers a good example of the importance of surf tourism in the U.S. by way of the Trestles surf break in San Diego County, California. This particular surf break is visited by 300,000 people annually, each of whom spends $80 per visit, for a total of $24 million each year. These and the foregoing statistics are perhaps unsurprising given that the median surfer earns $75,000 per year (waveloch.com).

  4. More specifically, results in Scorse et al. (2015) suggest that a residence that is adjacent to a surf break benefits from a $106,000 premium when compared to an equivalent residence a mile away.

  5. As this series of publications indicates, one stream is built on the foundational work of Gordon (1954), Scott (1955), Coase (1960), Hardin (1968), Ostrom (1990) and Cole (2002), and the other is represented in seminal studies by Demsetz (1967), Umbeck (1981) and Libecap (1989).

  6. According to surfline.com’s Surfology glossary (https://www.surfline.com/surfology/surfology_glossary_index.cfm), a “surf break” is a line where waves begin to break, which, ceteris paribus, generally occurs when they reach water depths equaling approximately 1.3 times the wave face height. A wave’s face is the steepening shoreward front of a wave, where most riding takes place (Surfology).

  7. A “curl” is an “older term used to describe the concave face of the wave just before breaking (Surfology).”

  8. Kaffine (2009, 731) adds that treating surf break quality as exogenous “isolates the incentives locals have to close the commons.”

  9. As Kaffine (2009, 732) points out, these conclusions are intuitive given that a higher quality surf break will draw the interest of a larger number of surfers, fiercer property rights protection will deter more surfers from accessing the surf break, and fewer surfers will be interested in surfing a given break if better returns can be had elsewhere.

  10. As Kaffine (2009, 733) indicates, the first term in (6) captures the direct benefits that local surfers receive from the surf break, while the second term captures the indirect congestion costs due to an increase in non-local surfers.

  11. As Kaffine (2009, 734) adds, here surf break congestion disutility affects local surfers more than it does non-local surfers, such that ∂UL/∂n < ∂UNL/∂n and \( \partial U_{L}^{2} /\partial q\partial n < \partial U_{NL}^{2} /\partial q\partial n \), and (1) takes the form, \( \mathop {\hbox{max} }\limits_{y} (B_{L} q^{2} /n) - cy^{2} \), while (2) takes the form, \( \left( {B_{\text{NL}} q/n} \right) \, {-}py = \bar{V} \). Lastly, rearranging for n and inserting into the local surfers’ optimization problem and solving for y* yields, y* = q(BLp/2BNLc) (Kaffine 2009, 734).

  12. Other sources (http://www.innatmavericks.com/blog/mavericks-half-moon-bay/) classify Clark as a re-discoverer of Mavericks, and instead attribute its original discovery to Half Moon Bay surfers Alex Matienzo, Jim Thompson and Dick Knottmeyer, who first surfed there in 1967.

  13. Kaffine (2009, 729) points out that many local surfers feel that they own a surf break after surfing it for years, thus replicating patterns of behavior that have been observed in common-pool lobster fisheries (Acheson 1988). In a brief footnote, Mixon (2014, 381) cites the Clark/Mavericks case as an extreme example of “local surfer ownership”.

  14. This assertion is supported by the relatively small group that eventually joined Clark at Mavericks.

  15. As in the Roth and Skarbek (2014) model of prison gang size, a surf gang may be developed on a hierarchical basis, meaning that there may be “degrees of membership” (see also Leeson and Skarbek 2010).

  16. See Surfer Today (https://www.surfertoday.com/surfing/9554-the-most-feared-surf-gangs-in-the-world).

  17. See Surfer Today and IndoSurfLife.com.

  18. See IndoSurfLife.com.

  19. See IndoSurfLife.com.

  20. See IndoSurfLife.com.

  21. The victim in this case is a teacher who attempted to surf the Lunada Bay break but suffered a broken pelvis, allegedly at the hands of the Bay Boys (Harper 2015).

  22. See IndoSurfLife.com.

  23. See Surfer Today. For an ethnographic approach to surf gang behavior, see Usher and Gómez (2016). These authors examine the surf localism among local Costa Rican and foreign resident surfers in Pavones, Costa Rica, a well-known surf break considered the second longest left-breaking wave in the world. Through interviews they find that Costa Rican surfers feel a greater sense of ownership of the surf break, but were less likely to start verbal or physical conflicts with other surfers than resident foreigners, who indicated feeling a right to the break, more so than ownership.

  24. Data on surf gangs’ ages, sizes, and activities are, perhaps unsurprisingly, relatively scant.

  25. Given the small sample size, there is, admittedly, noise present in any statistical inference that is drawn in this portion of the study.

  26. Unfortunately, documenting the scope, or existence, of pecuniary and in-kind rent seeking activity in this specific context is a virtually impossible task.

References

  • Acheson JM (1988) The lobster gangs of maine. University Press of New England, Hanover

    Google Scholar 

  • Aguirre A (2008) Pro surfer’s death exposes beach town’s violent side. New York Times 12, May

  • Aron H (2016) Can a cop, a model and two lawyers break a surf gang’s 45-year grip on Lunada Bay? LA Weekly 9, May

  • Buchanan JM (1965) An economic theory of clubs. Economica 32:1–14

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark J (2013) Discovering mavericks. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y-uqE0Y4FOo

  • Clark J (2015) Conquering the wave that no-one dared to surf. BBC News Magazine 4, February

  • Coase RH (1960) The problem of social cost. J Law Econ 3:1–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole DH (2002) Pollution and property: comparing ownership institutions for environmental protection. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cornes R, Sandler T (1996) The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Demsetz H (1967) Towards a theory of property rights. Am Econ Rev 57:347–357

    Google Scholar 

  • Douglas A (2017) Battle for the bay. Surfer Mag 25, September

  • Ferry D (2016) The dirty secret of violent surf localism: it works. Outside Mag 19, April

  • Gordon HS (1954) The theory of a common property resource: the fishery. J Polit Econ 62:124–142

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162:1243–1248

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harper (2015) A gang of rich, white surfer dudes is terrorizing a California beach town. VICE.com 4, August

  • Kaffine DT (2009) Quality and the commons: the surf gangs of California. J Law Econ 52:727–743

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krueger AO (1974) The political economy of the rent-seeking society. Am Econ Rev 64:291–303

    Google Scholar 

  • Kvinta P (2013) Surfonomics 101. Fortune 5, June

  • Laband DN, McClintock GC (2001) The transfer society. Cato Institute, Washington, D.C

    Google Scholar 

  • Laffont JJ, Tirole J (1991) The politics of government decision-making: a theory of regulatory capture. Quart J Econ 106:1089–1127

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leeson PT, Skarbek D (2010) Criminal constitutions. Glob Crime 11:279–298

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Libecap GD (1989) Contracting for property rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Medina N (2017) Santa cruz surf rivalry. The Art/Crime Archive 28, April

  • Mixon FG Jr (2014) Bad vibrations: new evidence on commons quality and localism at California’s surf breaks. Int Rev Econ 61:379–397

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mixon FG Jr, Caudill SB (2018) Guarding giants: resource commons quality and informal property rights in big-wave surfing. Empir Econ 54:1697–1715

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mixon FG Jr, Laband DN, Ekelund RB Jr (1994) Rent seeking and hidden in-kind resource distortion: some empirical evidence. Public Choice 78:171–185

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mondy B (2016) Five of surfing’s most fiercely protected local breaks. Adventure Sports Netw 27, May

  • Moro FN, Petrella A, Sberna S (2016) The politics of Mafia violence: explaining variation in Mafia killings in southern Italy (1983–2008). Terrorism Political Violence 28:90–113

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Haver H (2016) A brief history of surf gangs and the law. Complex Mag 9, June

  • Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J (1994) Rules, games and common-pool resources. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Peltzman S (1976) Toward a more general theory of regulation. J Law Econ 19:211–240

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peralta S, George S (2004) Riding giants. Sony Home Entertainment, Culver City

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierson D (2018) Lunada bay boys cleared of federal lawsuit. Surfline.com

  • Rider R (1998) Hangin’ ten: the common-pool resource problem of surfing. Public Choice 97:49–64

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth MG, Skarbek D (2014) Prison gangs and the community responsibility system. Rev Behav Econ 1:223–243

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandler T (2013) Buchanan clubs. Const Polit Econ 24:265–284

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scorse J, Reynolds F III, Sackett A (2015) Impact of surf breaks on home prices in Santa Cruz, CA. Tour Econ 21:409–418

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scott A (1955) The fishery: the objectives of sole ownership. J Polit Econ 63:116–124

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skarbek D (2010) Putting the ‘con’ into constitutions: the economics of prison gangs. J Law Econ Organ 26:183–211

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skarbek D (2011) Governance and prison gangs. Am Polit Sci Rev 105:702–716

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skarbek D (2012) Prison gangs, norms, and organizations. J Econ Behav Organ 82:96–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skarbek D (2014) The social order of the underworld: how prison gangs govern the American penal system. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sobel RS, Garrett TA (2002) On the measurement of rent seeking and its social opportunity cost. Public Choice 112:115–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stigler GJ (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock G (1967) The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. West Econ J 5:224–232

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock G (1989) The economics of special privilege and rent seeking. Kluwer, Boston

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Umbeck JR (1981) Might makes right: a theory of the foundation and initial distribution of property rights. Econ Inq 19:38–59

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Usher LE, Gómez E (2016) Surf localism in Costa Rica: exploring territoriality among Costa Rican and foreign resident surfers. J Sport Tour 20:195–216

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Economic Education, Columbus State University, 4225 University Avenue, Columbus, GA, 31907, USA

    Franklin G. Mixon Jr.

Authors
  1. Franklin G. Mixon Jr.
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Franklin G. Mixon Jr..

Additional information

The author is grateful to two anonymous referees and Todd Sandler for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Mixon, F.G. Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs. Econ Gov 19, 381–396 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-018-0211-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-018-0211-6

Keywords

JEL Classification

Search

Navigation