Economics of Governance

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 203–219 | Cite as

Importance of status quo when lobbying a coalition government

  • R. Emre AytimurEmail author
Original Paper


Lobbying a coalition government is different from lobbying a single-party government, since in the case of a coalition government, the interest group can intervene in the intragovernmental decision process. In the case where the interest group prefers the status quo to the surplus maximizing policy, the interest group influences the policy without any contribution due to its credible threat to block unfavorable proposals. Furthermore, we show that when, say, a leftist coalition government may be replaced by a rightist coalition government, the final policy reflects a rightist interest group’s preferences more heavily due to the interest group’s forward-looking considerations.


Lobbying Coalition governments Status quo Policy-making  Interest group contribution 

JEL Classification

C78 D72 D78 



I thank François Salanié, Jacques Crémer, the editor Mattias Polborn, and two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Chair of Public EconomicsGeorg-August University GöttingenGöttingenGermany

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