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Escalating penalties: a supergame approach

Economics of Governance volume 13, pages 29–49 (2012)Cite this article

Abstract

The paper provides an economic rationale for punishing repeat offenders with increasing sanctions. We analyze the optimal intertemporal punishment scheme within a supergame framework, in which the legal authority is assumed to minimize the social costs of punishment under the constraint of keeping delinquency at an exogenously given maximal tolerable level.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Profilstr. 8, 58084, Hagen, Germany

    Alfred Endres & Bianca Rundshagen

  2. University of Witten/Herdecke, Witten, Germany

    Alfred Endres

Authors
  1. Alfred Endres
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  2. Bianca Rundshagen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alfred Endres.

Additional information

The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Tim Friehe, University of Constance, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Endres, A., Rundshagen, B. Escalating penalties: a supergame approach. Econ Gov 13, 29–49 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0101-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-011-0101-7

Keywords

  • Crime prevention
  • Repeat offenders

JEL Classification

  • K14
  • H40