Abstract
Politicians seeking reelection need voters to know what they have done for them. Thus, incentives may arise to spend more money where media coverage is higher. We present a simple model to explain the allocation of public spending across jurisdictions contingent on media activity. A politician seeking to maximize the probability of reelection will shift more money to jurisdictions where an extra dollar raises more votes because a larger share of the electorate is informed about his policy. The main prediction of the model is that media activity is higher in the core areas of media markets. This implies higher spending levels there and lower spending levels in remote jurisdictions. Empirical support for this prediction is found using United States data on county-level federal grant allocation, Designated Market Areas and the location of licensed television stations.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Bruns, C., Himmler, O. Media activity and public spending. Econ Gov 11, 309–332 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-010-0083-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-010-0083-x