Abstract
This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conflict between regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly resources to fight each other over political borders. We derive the probability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist conflict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats. We also model civil conflict over types of government, after borders have been determined, and study how this political conflict affects the incentives to secede.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Alesina A, Spolaore E (1997) On the number and size of nations. Q J Econ 112(4):1027–1056
Alesina A, Spolaore E (2003) The size of nations. MIT Press, Cambridge
Alesina A, Spolaore E (2005) War, peace and the size of countries. J Public Econ 89(7):1333–1354
Alesina A, Spolaore E (2006) Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. Eur Econ Rev 50(1):91–120
Alesina A, Spolaore E, Wacziarg R (2000) Economic integration and political disintegration. Am Econ Rev 90(5):1276–1296
Alesina A, Spolaore E, Wacziarg R (2005) Trade, growth, and the size of countries. In: Aghion P, Durlauf S (eds) Handbook of economic growth. North Holland, Amsterdam
Anderson B (1983) Imagined communities. Verso, London
Bolton P, Roland G (1997) The breakups of nations: a political economy analysis. Q J Econ 112(4):1057–89
Bordignon M, Brusco S (2001) Optimal secession rules. Euro Econ Rev 45:1811–34
Caselli F, Coleman WJ (2006) On the theory of ethnic conflict. NBER working paper no. W12125, Cambrifge
Collier P (2001) The economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. In: Crocker CA, Hampson FO, Aall PR (eds) Turbulent peace: the challenges of managing international conflict. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC
Collier P, Hoeffler A (1998) On economic causes of civil war. Oxf Econ Pap 50(4):563–573
Ellingsen T (1998) Externalities and internalities: A model of political integration. J Public Econ 68(2): 251–68
Fearon J, Laitin D (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. Am Polit Sci Rev 97(1):75–90
Findlay R (1996) Towards a model of territorial expansion and the limits of empires. In: Garfinkel M, Skaperdas S (eds) The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK
Garfinkel MR (1990) Arming as a strategic investment in a cooperative equilibrium. Am Econ Rev 80: 50–68
Garfinkel MR (2004a) Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict. Euro J Polit Econ 20:829–852
Garfinkel MR (2004b) On the stable formation of groups: managing the conflict within. Conflict Manage Peace Sci 21:43–68
Garfinkel MR (2004c) Global threats and the domestic struggle for power. Eur J Polit Econ 20:495–508
Garfinkel MR, Skaperdas S (2006) Economics of conflict: an overview. In: Hartley K, Sandler T (eds) Handbook of defense economics, vol 2. North Holland, Amsterdam (forthcoming)
Gellner E (1983) Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Gershenson D, Grossman HI (2000) Civil conflict: Ended or never ending? J Conflict Resolut 44(6):807–821
Goyal S, Staal K (2004) The political economy of regionalism. Eur Econ Rev 48:563–593
Grossman HI (1991) A general equilibrium model of insurrections. Am Econ Rev 81:912–921
Grossman HI (1994) Production, appropriation, and land reform. Am Econ Rev 84:705–712
Grossman HI, Iyigun MF (1997) Population increase and the end of colonialism. Economica 64:483–93
Grossman HI, Kim M (1995) Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property. J Polit Econ 103:1275–1288
Gurr TR (2000) Peoples versus states: minorities at risk in the new century. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC
Haavelmo T (1954) A study in the theory of economic evolution. North Holland, Amsterdam
Hiscox M (2003) Political integration and disintegration in the global economy. In: Kahler M, Lake D (eds) Globalizing authority. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Hirshleifer J (1989) Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: ratio versus difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63:101–112
Hirshleifer J (1991) The technology of conflict as an economic activity. Am Econ Rev 81(2):130–134
Hirshleifer J (1995) Anarchy and its breakdown. J Polit Econ 103(1):26–52
Horowitz DL (1985) Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press, Berkeley
Lake D, O’Mahony A (2004) The incredible shrinking state: explaining the territorial size of countries. J Conflict Resolut 48(5):699–722
LeBreton M, Weber S (2003) The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession. IMF Staff Pap 50(3):403–435
Lester A (2005) Trade and the end of trust: endogenous group formation and inter-group hostility. Brown University
Münster J, Staal K (2005) War with outsiders make peace inside. Discussion paper no. 75, University of Mannheim
Powell R (1999) In the shadow of power: states and strategies in international politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Skaperdas S (1992) Cooperation, conflict and power in the absence of property rights. Am Econ Rev 82(4):720–39
Skaperdas S, Vaidya S (2005) Persuasion as a contest. University of California, Irvine
Spolaore E (2004) Economic integration, international conflict and political unions. Rivista di Politica Economica 94:3–50
Spolaore (2006) National borders and the size of nations. In: Weingast BR, Wittman DA (eds) The Oxford handbook of political economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Tilly C (1990) Coercion, capital and European states, AD 990-1990. Blackwell, Cambridge
Tullock G (1980) Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan JM, Tollison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station
Wittman DA (2000) The wealth and size of nations. J Conflict Resolut 6:885–895
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
This paper has been written in memory of Herschel Grossman, and owes much to his inspiration. I am grateful to Michelle Garfinkel and David Weil, who co-organized a conference in Herschel’s honor at Brown in April 2006, for their encouragement. I thank Michelle Garfinkel and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Spolaore, E. Civil conflict and secessions. Economics of Governance 9, 45–63 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0034-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-007-0034-3