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Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes

Economics of Governance volume 9, pages 103–129 (2008)Cite this article

Abstract

We present a model of a fiscal constitution (i.e., a transfer scheme between income classes) that is self-enforcing against a background in which predatory activities (‘revolutions’) are feasible. In this environment, a constitution self-enforces by structuring society’s interests in such a way that non- compliance necessarily results in a revolution which society would rather avoid.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CEE, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico, Mexico

    Dragan Filipovich & Jaume Sempere

Authors
  1. Dragan Filipovich
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  2. Jaume Sempere
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Correspondence to Jaume Sempere.

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Filipovich, D., Sempere, J. Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes. Economics of Governance 9, 103–129 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7

Keywords

  • Anarchy
  • Constitutions
  • Redistribution
  • Self-enforcement

JEL Classification

  • D23
  • D30
  • D74
  • H10