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Distortionary lobbying

Abstract

We study the role of partisan committee members in an information aggregation setup à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Based on their analysis we show that interest groups may impose a huge welfare loss on society because their activities distort political outcomes more than would be needed in order to achieve their own objectives. In an information acquisition framework à la Mukhopadhaya/Persico we argue that uninformed interest groups may instead improve the quality of some committee decisions.

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Correspondence to Mike Felgenhauer.

Additional information

We thank participants of the WZB conference on “Interest groups and economic performance”, an anonymous referee, and in particular Ashish Chaturvedi, Kai Konrad, and Ami Glazer for useful comments.

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Felgenhauer, M., Grüner, H.P. Distortionary lobbying. Economics of Governance 8, 181–195 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-006-0024-x

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Keywords

  • Committees
  • Information aggregation
  • Interest groups
  • Voting

JEL classification

  • D71
  • D72
  • D73