We study the role of partisan committee members in an information aggregation setup à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Based on their analysis we show that interest groups may impose a huge welfare loss on society because their activities distort political outcomes more than would be needed in order to achieve their own objectives. In an information acquisition framework à la Mukhopadhaya/Persico we argue that uninformed interest groups may instead improve the quality of some committee decisions.
KeywordsCommittees Information aggregation Interest groups Voting
JEL classificationD71 D72 D73
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