Economics of Governance

, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 181–195 | Cite as

Distortionary lobbying

Original Paper

Abstract

We study the role of partisan committee members in an information aggregation setup à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Based on their analysis we show that interest groups may impose a huge welfare loss on society because their activities distort political outcomes more than would be needed in order to achieve their own objectives. In an information acquisition framework à la Mukhopadhaya/Persico we argue that uninformed interest groups may instead improve the quality of some committee decisions.

Keywords

Committees Information aggregation Interest groups Voting 

JEL classification

D71 D72 D73 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Austen-Smith D, Banks JS (1996) Information aggregation, rationality, and the condorcet jury theorem. Am Polit Sci Rev 90(1):34–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Condorcet Marquis de (1785) Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues a la pluralité des voix. Paris, L’imprimerie royaleGoogle Scholar
  3. Dal Bo E (2002) Bribing voters. Manuscript, New College and Wadham College, University of OxfordGoogle Scholar
  4. Doraszelski U, Gerardi D, Squintani F (2003) Communication and voting with double-sided information. Contrib Theor Econ 3(1):Article 6Google Scholar
  5. Feddersen TJ, Pesendorfer W (1996) The swing voter’s curse. Am Econ Rev 86(3):408–424Google Scholar
  6. Feddersen TJ, Pesendorfer W (1997) Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica 65(5):1029–1058CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Feddersen TJ, Pesendorfer W (1998) Convicting the innocent: the inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting. Am Polit Sci Rev 92(1):23–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Feddersen TJ, Pesendorfer W (1999a) Election, information aggregation and strategic voting. Proc Nat Acad Sci 96:10572–10574CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Feddersen TJ, Pesendorfer W (1999b) Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences. Am Polit Sci Rev 93(2):381–398CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Felgenhauer M, Grüner HP (2004) Committees and special interests. Manuscript, Mannheim UniversityGoogle Scholar
  11. Genicot G, Ray D (2004) Contracts and Externalities: how things fall apart. forthcoming J Econ TheoryGoogle Scholar
  12. Gerardi D (2000) Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity. Am Polit Sci Rev 94(2):395–406CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Gerardi D, Yariv L (2002) Putting your ballot where your mouth is—an analysis of collective choice with communication. Manuscript, UCLAGoogle Scholar
  14. Li H, Rosen S, Suen W (2001) Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees. Am Econ Rev 91:1478–1497CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Martinelli C (2002) Would rational voters acquire costly information? Discussion Paper 02–10, Instituto Technológico Autónomo de MéxicoGoogle Scholar
  16. Mukhopadhaya K (2003) Jury size and the free rider problem. J Law Econ Organ 19(1):24–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Persico N (2004) Committee design with endogenous information. Rev Econ Studies 71(1):165–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Tullock G (1972) The purchase of politicians. West Econ J 10:354–355Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universität MannheimMannheimGermany
  2. 2.Universität Mannheim and CEPRMannheimGermany

Personalised recommendations