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On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests

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Abstract.

It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, 44221, Dortmund

    Wolfgang Leininger

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  1. Wolfgang Leininger
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Correspondence to Wolfgang Leininger.

Additional information

Received: 10 February 2002, Accepted: 8 July 2002,

JEL Classification:

C79, D72, D 74

Wolfgang Leininger: I have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Burkhard Hehenkamp and two anonymous referees.

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Leininger, W. On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests. Economics of Governance 4, 177–186 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-002-0055-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-002-0055-x

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