Abstract
Non-human animals vary in their ability to make and use tools. The goal of the present study was to further explore what, if anything, differs between tool-users and non-tool-users, and whether these differences lie in the conceptual or motor domain. We tested two species that typically do not use tools—cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)—on problems that mirrored those designed for prolific tool users such as chimpanzees. We trained subjects on a task in which they could choose one of two canes to obtain an out-of-reach food reward. After training, subjects received several variations on the original task, each designed to examine a specific conceptual aspect of the pulling problem previously studied in other tool-using species. Both species recognized that effective pulling tools must be made of rigid materials. Subsequent conditions revealed significant species differences, with vervets outperforming tamarins across many conditions. Vervets, but not tamarins, had some recognition of the relationship between a tool's orientation and the position of the food reward, the relationship between a tool's trajectory and the substance that it moves on, and that tools must be connected in order to work properly. These results provide further evidence that tool-use may derive from domain-general, rather than domain-specific cognitive capacities that evolved for tool use per se.
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Notes
Note that such a domain-specific account of human tool understanding stands in contrast to a domain-general view, one in which our understanding of tools emerges as a result of our more general knowledge of physics, objects motion, and causality (see Mandler 2002 for such an account).
Although we focus on primate tool-use, we fully acknowledge the exceptional tool-using capacities of other taxonomic groups, especially the corvids (Hunt 1996; Chappell and Kacelnik 2002, 2004; Weir et al. 2002; Hunt and Gray 2004a,b). We restrict our focus to primates for both evolutionarily-motivated theoretical reasons, as well as methodological questions of motoric capacities.
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Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Andy Baron, Stacey Dworkin, Dana Gavrieli, and Justin Junge for their help in running these experiments. All of this research conforms to federal guidelines for use of animals in research. LRS was supported by an NSF Predoctoral Fellowship and Yale University. MDH was supported by the NSF (SBR-9357976), the NEPRC (PHS-P51RR00168-37), and Harvard University.
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Santos, L.R., Pearson, H.M., Spaepen, G.M. et al. Probing the limits of tool competence: Experiments with two non-tool-using species (Cercopithecus aethiops and Saguinus oedipus). Anim Cogn 9, 94–109 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-005-0001-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-005-0001-8