Abstract.
The voting situations at which the Borda rule or the Copeland method can be manipulated by a single voter or a coalition of voters in three-alternative elections are characterized. From these characterizations, we derive (when possible) some analytical representations measuring the vulnerability of these rules to strategic misrepresentation of preferences. Our results suggest that the Borda rule is significantly more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than the Copeland method.
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Received: 6 April 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001
The authors are indebted to the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and their help in improving the manuscript.
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Favardin, P., Lepelley, D. & Serais, J. Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation. Rev Econ Design 7, 213–228 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200073
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200073