Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives

  • Published:
Review of Economic Design Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

We consider games with n players and r alternatives. In these games each player must choose one and only one alternative, reaching an ordered partition of the set of players. An extension of the Shapley value to this framework is studied.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Applied Economy I, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea/Universidad del País Vasco, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain (e-mail: eupalirm@bs.ehu.es; eupsaloj@bs.ehu.es; eupzazaj@bs.ehu.es) , , , , , , ES

    M.J. Albizuri, J.C. Santos & J.M. Zarzuelo

Authors
  1. M.J. Albizuri
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. J.C. Santos
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. J.M. Zarzuelo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Received: 1 November 1997 / Accepted: 24 January 1999

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Albizuri, M., Santos, J. & Zarzuelo, J. Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives. Rev Econ Design 4, 345–356 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050041

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050041

Search

Navigation