Abstract.
In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the aforementioned restriction is dropped.
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Received: 13 July 1995 / Accepted: 2 December 1997
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Beviá, C. Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods. Rev Econ Design 3, 195–213 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050013
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050013