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Review of Economic Design

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 33–48 | Cite as

Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

Original Paper
  • 74 Downloads

Abstract

We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.

Keywords

Random assignment Ex-ante efficiency Consistency Sequential pseudomarket 

JEL Classification

D47 D50 D60 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universitat Autonoma de BarcelonaCerdanyola del VallèsSpain
  2. 2.Barcelona Graduate School of EconomicsBarcelonaSpain

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