Advertisement

Review of Economic Design

, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp 265–287 | Cite as

Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making

  • Susumu CatoEmail author
Original Paper
  • 213 Downloads

Abstract

This paper examines an extended framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We consider two classes of values: consequential values and non-consequential values. Each individual has a comprehensive preference based on the two. Non-consequential values are assumed to be homogeneous among individuals. It is shown that a social ordering function satisfying Arrovian conditions must be non-consequential: a social comprehensive preference gives unequivocal priority to non-consequential values. We clarify the role of common preferences over non-consequential features.

Keywords

Non-consequentialism Arrow’s impossibility theorem   Collective decision making Welfarism 

JEL Classification

D63 D71 

Notes

Acknowledgments

An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “The role of common morality in social choice.” I am grateful to Katsuhito Iwai, Kazuya Kamiya, Tomohiko Kawamori, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Masayuki Otaki, Toyotaka Sakai, Dan Sasaki, Kotaro Suzumura, Naoki Yoshihara, two anonymous referees, an associate editor, and Atila Abdulkadiroglu of this journal for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper was financially supported by Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (Start-up; B) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

References

  1. Arrow KJ (1951) Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  2. Black D (1948) On the rationale of group decision-making. J Polit Econ 56:23–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Blackorby C, Bossert W, Donaldson D (2005) Multi-profile welfarism: a generalization. Soc Choice Welfare 24:253–267CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Blau JH (1957) The existence of social welfare functions. Econometrica 25:302–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Cato S (2011) Pareto principles, positive responsiveness, and majority decisions. Theory Decis 71:503–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Cato S (2012) Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis. Soc Choice Welfare 39:869–889CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cato S (2014) Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited. Theory Decis 76:511–527 doi: 10.1007/s11238-013-9384-1
  8. Dworkin R (1977) Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  9. Fishburn PC (1976) Dictators on blocks: generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems. J Comb Theory Ser B 20:153–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Fleurbaey M, Suzumura K, Tadenuma K (2005a) Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces? J Econ Theory 124:22–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Fleurbaey M, Suzumura K, Tadenuma K (2005b) The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation. Soc Choice Welfare 24:311–341CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Fleurbaey M, Tungodden B, Chang HF (2003) Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle: a comment. J Polit Econ 111:1382–1385CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Gaertner W (2002) Domain restriction. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 131–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Gotoh R, Suzumura K, Yoshihara N (2005) Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen. Int J Econ Theory 1:21–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Gravel N (1994) Can a ranking of opportunity sets attach an intrinsic importance to freedom of choice? Am Econ Rev 84:454–458Google Scholar
  16. Hammond PJ (1976) Equity, Arrow’s conditions, and Rawls’ difference principles. Econometrica 44:793–804CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Hansson B (1973) The independence condition in the theory of social choice. Theory Decis 4:25–49Google Scholar
  18. Iwata Y (2009) Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains. Soc Choice Welfare 32:513–531CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Kaplow L, Shavell S (2001) Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle. J Polit Econ 109:281–286CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Kaplow L, Shavell S (2002) Fairness versus welfare. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  21. Kaplow L, Shavell S (2004) Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle: reply. J Polit Econ 112:249–251CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Kelsey D (1987) The role of information in social welfare judgement. Oxf Econ Pap 39:301–317Google Scholar
  23. Maskin ES (1995) Majority rule, social welfare functions, and game forms. In: Basu K, Pattanaik PK, Suzumura K (eds) Choice, welfare, and development: a festschrift in honour of Amartya K. Sen. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 100–109Google Scholar
  24. Pattanaik PK, Suzumura K (1994) Rights, welfarism and social choice. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 84:435–439Google Scholar
  25. Pattanaik PK, Suzumura K (1996) Individual rights and social evaluation: a conceptual framework. Oxf Econ Pap 48:194–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Perfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  27. Pettit P (2000) Non-consequentialism and universalizability. Philos Q 50:175–190CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  29. Sakai T, Shimoji M (2006) Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice. Soc Choice Welfare 26:435–445CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Scheffler S (1982) The rejection of consequentialism. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  31. Sen AK (1977) On weights and measures:informational constraints in social welfare analysis. Econometrica 45:1539–1572Google Scholar
  32. Sen AK (1970) Collective choice and social welfare. Holden-Day, San FranciscoGoogle Scholar
  33. Sen AK (1979) Personal utilities and public judgements: or what’s wrong with welfare economics. Econ J 89:537–558CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Sen AK (1986) Information and invariance in normative choice. In: Da Starret, Heller WP, Starr RM (eds) Social choice and public decision making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 29–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Suzumura K (1999) Consequence, opportunities, and procedures. Soc Choice Welfare 16:17–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Suzumura K, Xu Y (2001) Characterizations of consequentialism and non-consequentialism. J Econ Theory 101:423–436CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Suzumura K, Xu Y (2004) Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem. Soc Choice Welfare 22:237–251CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Suzumura K, Yoshihara N (2008) On initial conferment of individual rights., Discussion Paper SeriesInstitute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi UniversityGoogle Scholar
  39. Yoshihara N (2008) On non-welfarist social ordering functions. In: Pattanaik PK, Tadenuma K, Xu Y, Yoshihara N (eds) Rational choice and social welfare: theory and applications (in honor of Kotaro Suzumura). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp 43–67Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Social ScienceThe University of TokyoTokyoJapan

Personalised recommendations