Abstract
We allow departures from IIA in Arrow’s framework. Our measure of the extent of a departure is the amount of information needed to socially order a pair of alternatives. We also propose a measure of the scope of an individual’s power. The scope of at least one individual’s power increases in step with a reduction in the amount of information that has to be gathered to socially order two alternatives. This result is also established for correspondences, which select a subset of the feasible set as a function of individual preferences.
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We are grateful to our referees and the associate editor who made significant contributions to the paper.
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Campbell, D.E., Kelly, J.S. Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power. Rev Econ Design 17, 165–181 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3