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Circular domains

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Abstract

I introduce the notion of circular domains and prove that on any circular domain there is no strategy-proof and nondictatorial social choice function. Moreover, I show that on any proper subset of a minimal circular domain, there exists a group strategy-proof and essential social choice function. These results together detect the minimal size of the domains over which the incompatibility arises with respect to pairs of democratic-incentive requirements (nondictatorial, strategy-proof) and (essential, group strategy-proof).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka, 814-0180, Japan

    Shin Sato

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  1. Shin Sato
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Correspondence to Shin Sato.

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Sato, S. Circular domains. Rev Econ Design 14, 331–342 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0102-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0102-y

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