Abstract
We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.
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I am grateful to Alison Watts for her time and invaluable suggestions. I would like to thank Paul Melvin, all seminar participants at SIUC and an anonymous referee for their feedback.
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Patil, H. Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation. Rev Econ Design 15, 121–145 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0097-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-009-0097-4