Abstract
In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible weight-profiles of assemblies as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of both neo-parliamentary and semi-presidential government forms provided that the majority formation rule is collegial, namely there is one electorally fixed minimal majority coalition.
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Vannucci, S. A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires. Rev. Econ. Design 12, 33–44 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y