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Contingent payments in selection contests

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Abstract

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Management, NFH, University of Tromsø, 9037, Tromsø, Norway

    Derek J. Clark & Christian Riis

  2. Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Management, Nydalsveien 37, 0442, Oslo, Norway

    Christian Riis

Authors
  1. Derek J. Clark
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  2. Christian Riis
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christian Riis.

Additional information

This paper is part of the project “The Knowledge-Based Society” sponsored by the Research Council of Norway (project 172603/V10).

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Clark, D.J., Riis, C. Contingent payments in selection contests. Rev. Econ. Design 11, 125–137 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0030-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0030-7

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