Abstract
For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, a rule is consistent if the choice it makes for each problem is always in agreement with the choice it makes for each “reduced problem” obtained by imagining that some claimants leave with their awards and reassessing the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining claimants. We develop a general technique to determine whether a given two-claimant rule admits a consistent extension to general populations, and to identify this extension if it exists. We apply the technique to a succession of examples.
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I gratefully acknowledge support from NSF under grant SBR-9731431 and SES 0214691, and the comments of Carmen Bevia, Rodrigo Velez, Chun-Hsien Yeh, and a referee.
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Thomson, W. On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach. Rev. Econ. Design 11, 225–251 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0027-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0027-2
Keywords
- Claims problems
- Consistent extensions
- Proportional rule
- Constrained equal awards rule
- Constrained equal losses rule