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Seniority bias in a tournament

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Abstract

The paper presents a model where the probability of promotion tends to increase with seniority (overall labor market experience) without relying on the accumulation of general human capital. To this end, we consider the optimal design of a tournament (a relative compensation scheme) between two agents with different time horizon, the young and the old, in an overlapping generations framework. When the principal can only imperfectly monitor each agent’s effort level, the difference in time horizon leads to the ex post difference in the marginal value of effort between the two agents. In this case, the optimal tournament necessarily involves a bias towards the old agent. Within this framework, we also examine the relationship between: (1) the monitoring accuracy and the optimal bias; and (2) the value of outside options and the optimal bias.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, 1-31 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043, Japan

    Junichiro Ishida

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  1. Junichiro Ishida
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Correspondence to Junichiro Ishida.

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Ishida, J. Seniority bias in a tournament. Rev. Econ. Design 10, 143–164 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0008-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0008-x

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