Abstract.
In a public good economy where agents' preferences are known but endowments are private information, instituting an allocation rule and asking the agents their initial endowments induces an endowment-pretension game. We analyse the Nash equilibrium allocations of this game and discuss its welfare properties with reference to voluntary contributions allocations.
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Received: 30 May 2001, Accepted: 23 September 2005
JEL Classification:
H41
I am grateful to Murat Sertel for his continuous support and encouragement; to Göksel Asan and Arunava Sen for their invaluable help. I would also like to thank Fikret Adaman, Ahmet Alkan, Salvador Barberá, Semih Koray, Andrei Ratiu, Muhamet Yíldíz, Ünal Zenginobuz, an Associate Editor and two referees of the Review of Economic Design for their enlightening comments on previous drafts. Earlier versions of this paper were written during my stay at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona and at the Indian Statistical Institute. Both visits have been possible by the kindness of the host institutions and the financial support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences and Serem Ltd. It is a pleasure for me to express my gratitude to all these institutions. Of course, all possible errors are mine.
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Sanver, M.R. Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies. Rev. Econ. Design 9, 307–316 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0133-y