Abstract.
We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consumes at most one object. In this environment we analyze the core of the economy and characterize the set of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. As an alternative approach, we consider property rights implicitly defined by a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism and show a core property for the mechanism-induced endowment rule.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Received: 19 February 2004, Accepted: 14 April 2005,
JEL Classification:
C71, C78, D71, D78
We would like to thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Financial support from The Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged by Lars-Gunnar Svensson. Financial support from The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged by Bo Larsson.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Svensson, LG., Larsson, B. Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade. Rev. Econ. Design 9, 167–190 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0126-x
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0126-x