Abstract.
It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.
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Received: 10 October 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005,
JEL Classification:
D63, D71
This paper was written while I was a research fellow at the ZiF (Bielefeld), for the project “Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution”, and the last version was prepared during my sabbatical year at Nuffield College, Oxford. I thank my hosts for their hospitality. D. Dimitrov and F. Maniquet have provided valuable comments on an earlier draft. I also thank the audience of a seminar at the U. of Montreal. Finally, the comments of three anonymous referees and the Associate Editor have been very helpful.
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Fleurbaey, M. The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense. Rev. Econ. Design 9, 145–166 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z