Abstract
This paper analyzes strategic environmental policy when polluting firms engage in overlapping ownership arrangements (OOAs) under differentiated duopoly with quantity competition. Specifically, we focus on two pollution control instruments: emission taxes and standards. The key findings are as follows: (i) Compared to the case without ownership, the optimal environmental tax rate and absolute standard are higher (lower) when the polluting firms’ products are complements (substitutes). (ii) Both the tax and standard policies are equally efficient in their effects on the firms’ output and abatement decisions, consumer surplus, environmental quality, and social welfare, regardless of whether the differentiated products are complements or substitutes. (iii) If the government sets equity share and emission tax (or standard) simultaneously to maximize social welfare, the optimal equity share may exceed 50% for OOA firms producing two complements and is inversely related to the degree of product complementarity. Our results have welfare implications for the choice of environmental regulation between taxes and standards, when equity share is exogenous, or when the government determines an optimal mix of equity share and emission tax (or standard).
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Notes
There is an important distinction between financial interest and corporate control in the industrial economics literature (e.g., O’Brien and Salop 2000). Our analysis focuses on the aspect of financial interest, which refers to an investment in receiving a positive share of a firm’s profit without having any discretions on the firm's operations and decisions. As for corporate control, it refers to situations under which shareholders/investors can make the decisions for the firm. Researchers further analyze the competitive and anticompetitive effects of partial ownership arrangements (see, e.g., Reynolds and Snapp 1986; Farrell and Shapiro 1990; Malueg 1992; O’Brien and Salop 2000; Clayton and Jorgensen 2005; Dietzenbacher and Temurshoev 2008; and Lopez and Vives 2019).
For studies on environmental policy under imperfectly competitive market, see Buchanan (1969), Adar and Griffin (1976), Barnett (1980), Levin (1985), Baumol and Oates (1988), Simpson (1995), Helfand (1999), Requate (2006), Lambertini and Tampieri (2012), and Moner and Rubio (2016), among others. In addressing pollution concern in the era of globalization, Tiba and Belaid (2020) examine how foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and trade openness affects environmental degradation. There empirical results show the possibilities of bidirectional long-term causality between CO2 emissions, GDP, trade openness, and FDI. As for the short-run scenarios, there is a unidirectional causality going from GDP to CO2, and from FDI to CO2. Interestingly, there is a bidirectional causality between trade openness and CO2.
Interesting cases of bilateral ownership arrangements as mentioned in Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo (2012) include the automobile industry. The Renault as a French auto firm has engaged in ownership arrangements with the Nissan (a Japanese auto manufacturer). Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo (2012) indicate that Renault acquires a 44.3% equity stake in Nissan Motor and Nissan Motor acquires a 15% stake in Renault. See Flath (1992), Fanti (2013, 2016), and Lopez and Vives (2019) for more discussions on examples of bilateral ownership arrangements.
Analyzing the case of symmetric Cournot duopoly, Reitman (1994) shows that both competing firms have incentives to acquire a passive stake in each other’s profits. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) note that there exists a mutually beneficial price at which each firm can sell some of its stock to its competitor if and only if the two firms' joint profits rise with the equity share (p. 287).
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Appendix A
Appendix A
A-1. Comparison between the equilibrium outcomes under OOAs \((\alpha > 0)\) and those in the absence of ownership \((\alpha = 0).\) The case of tax emission policy
It follows that \(t^{T} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - t^{T} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
We thus have \((\alpha > 0) - q^{T} (\alpha = 0) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(e^{T} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - e^{T} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
This result implies that \(a_{1}^{T} (\alpha > 0) - a_{1}^{T} (\alpha = 0) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(ED^{T} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - ED^{T} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(CS^{T} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - CS^{T} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
We thus have \(\pi^{T} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - \pi^{T} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(SW^{T} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - SW^{T} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
A-2. Comparison between the equilibrium outcomes under OOAs \((\alpha > 0)\) and those in the absence of ownership \((\alpha = 0).\) The case of emission standard policy
This result implies that \(s^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0.5} \right) - s^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(q^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - q^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
A numerical simulation shows that \(\pi_{i}^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - \pi_{i}^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) for any \(- 1 < \gamma < 1.\)
This result implies that \(a_{1}^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - a_{1}^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(ED^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - ED^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
It follows that \(CS^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - CS^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
We thus have the result that \(SW^{s} \left( {\alpha > 0} \right) - SW^{s} \left( {\alpha = 0} \right) > 0\) when \(\gamma < 0.\)
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Chang, YM., Sellak, M. Strategic environmental policy in a differentiated duopoly with overlapping ownership: a welfare analysis. Environ Econ Policy Stud 26, 199–217 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-022-00343-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-022-00343-z