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A verification approach to applied system security

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Abstract

We present a method for the security analysis of realistic models over off-the-shelf systems and their configuration by formal, machine-checked proofs. The presentation follows a large case study based on a formal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture.

The analysis is based on an abstract architecture (enforcing a role-based access control), which is refined to an implementation architecture (based on the usual discretionary access control provided by the POSIX environment). Both architectures serve as a skeleton to formulate access control and confidentiality properties.

Both the abstract and the implementation architecture are specified in the language Z. Based on a logical embedding of Z into Isabelle/HOL, we provide formal, machine-checked proofs for consistency properties of the specification, for the correctness of the refinement, and for security properties.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security, ETH Zürich, ETH-Zentrum, 8092, Zürich, Switzerland

    Achim D. Brucker

  2. Universität Freiburg, George-Köhler-Allee 52, 79110, Freiburg, Germany

    Burkhart Wolff

Authors
  1. Achim D. Brucker
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  2. Burkhart Wolff
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Achim D. Brucker.

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Brucker, A., Wolff, B. A verification approach to applied system security. Int J Softw Tools Technol Transfer 7, 233–247 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10009-004-0176-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10009-004-0176-3

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