Abstract
This paper analyzes a two-period setup in which firms differ with respect to costs of care and may use care-taking to signal type to consumers, who are able to observe precaution taken only ex post. Applying the refinement of the intuitive criterion to the concept of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we establish a unique separating equilibrium for every share of harm borne by firms. For low levels of victim compensation, we show that (i) firms choose weakly higher care in a setting in which customers do not know the firms’ type than in a setting in which they do, and (ii) the deviation in precaution taken due to asymmetric information on firm type is welfare-improving.
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Baumann, F., Friehe, T. Product liability and the virtues of asymmetric information. J Econ 100, 19–32 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0123-6