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Unfair contests

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Real-world contests are often “unfair” in the sense that outperforming all rivals may not be enough to be the winner, because some contestants are favored by the allocation rule, while others are handicapped. This paper analyzes an unfair, two-player discriminatory contest (all-pay auction) with private values. We characterize equilibrium strategies, provide closed form solutions, and illustrate additional strategic issues arising in such unfair contests.

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Correspondence to Gerd Muehlheusser.

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Feess, E., Muehlheusser, G. & Walzl, M. Unfair contests. J Econ 93, 267–291 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0308-9

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