Abstract
Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper it is assumed that ownership and management are separated. Contrary to the classical result of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly with private cost information, the paper shows that information sharing is no longer always a dominant strategy and expected consumer surplus is no longer always decreased. The paper determines the circumstances under which information is exchanged and analyzes its welfare consequences.
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Theilen, B. Delegation and Information Sharing in Cournot Duopoly. J Econ 92, 21–50 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0265-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0265-3