Abstract
This paper shows that when players ignore what outcome will emerge because of the presence of multiple equilibria, they can coordinate their expectations by forming an initial belief based on the principle of indifference followed by a process of reasoning that updates this belief. Since this procedure describes a natural way to form beliefs under indeterminacy, it is reasonable for every agent to conjecture that all the others form their beliefs according to the same logic. Exactly the fact that agents are aware that they form their beliefs following the same procedure allows them to successfully coordinate their expectations.
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Bonatti, L. Resolving Indeterminacy in Coordination Games: A New Approach Applied to a Pay-as-you-go Pension Scheme. J Econ 91, 273–295 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0256-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0256-4