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Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

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Abstract

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.

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  1. Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923, Köln, Germany

    Veronika Grimm

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  1. Veronika Grimm
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Correspondence to Veronika Grimm.

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Grimm, V. Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement. J Econ 90, 1–27 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3

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