Deontic STIT logic, from logical paradox to security policy
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Abstract
A deontic STIT logic is studied in this paper with the possible application of specifying security policies for intrude detection in the pervasive computing environment. Compared to the existing deontic STIT logics, an advantage of our logic is that it is capable of solving the miners paradox, a logical paradox which recently grabs attentions of logicians, philosophers, linguistists and computer scientists. A complete and sound axiomatization of our logic is developed.
Keywords
Deontic logic Miners paradox Security policy1 Introduction
Our ultimate goal in this article is to develop a logic to formalize security policies, especially for intrude detection in pervasive computing environments. Security is a high priority requirement for lots of information systems, and it is considered in practice as a more and more significant issue. In most systems, security requirements may already exist but usually remain informal, and starting from these requirements it is of growing interest to be able to define a rigorous security policy.
In pervasive computing environments, resources like information and services are accessible anywhere and anytime via any devices (Barolli and Takizawa 2010; Marcelloni et al. 2014; Ogiela et al. 2014; Ramos et al. 2014; Choi et al. 2014). There are different sorts of users and services, and some of them may be unknown or not predefined (Kagal et al. 2001). The distribution of resources in these environments forces us to leverage decentralized security management. In this setting, the environment is divided into a number of domains based on different factors. For each domain, there is a security agent with an administrator (we call it authority) who is responsible for preserving the security of resources that are under their protection.
Several authors have used deontic logic to specify security policies (Glasgow et al. 1992; Jones and Sergot 1992; Demolombe and Jones 1996; CuppensBoulahia and Cuppens 2008; Cuppens et al. 2013). These authors outlined the main features of this formalism to analyze further various aspects of security, to formalize previously informal security requirements and to provide a flexible and expressive language for specifying security properties. Deontic logic is a formal study of norms and deontic modalities (such as permission, forbidden and obligation). In 1951, the publication of von Wright (1951) indicates the birth of deontic logic. With the work of Meyer (1988), deontic logic became a part of computer science. Deontic logic has been a valuable tool in the specification and reasoning of security policies because key notions in security such as permission, authorization, prohibition and obligation are exactly the subjects of deontic logic. To apply deontic logic in the specification of security policies in pervasive computing environments, we need a deontic logic in which different authorities are explicitly modeled. Deontic STIT logic offers one option for this purpose. Deontic STIT logic (Horty 2001; Kooi and Tamminga 2008; Sun 2011; Broersen 2011), grounded on STIT (see to it that) theory (Belnap et al. 2001), is a branch of deontic logic developed by philosophers, logicians and computer scientists in recent years. In Kooi and Tamminga (2008) and Sun (2011), the authors develop deontic logics which are capable of models commands from different authorities.
Another reason for choosing deontic STIT logic comes from the motivation of the specification of policies of intrusion detection. CuppensBoulahia and Cuppens (2008) investigate the specification of intrusion detection policies. They argue that it is appropriate to use the bring it about modality for specification. Since the difference between bring it about and see to it that is negligible, deontic STIT logic can be an appropriate tool to specify policies of intrusion detection.
From a logical perspective, one limitation of the existing deontic STIT logic is that they are suffered from some logical paradoxes. This paper develops a new multiauthority deontic STIT logic (MADL) to overcome this problem such that our logic is more suitable for the application to security than the existing deontic STIT logics.
In the rest of this paper, we recap the miners paradox in Sect. 2 as a trigger of our further study. We then present our deontic STIT logic in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we discuss some related work. Section 5 summarizes this article with future work.
2 The miners paradox
There are 10 miners trapped in either shaft A or shaft B, but we don’t know which one. Water threatens to flood the shafts. We have sandbags to block only one shaft. If one shaft is blocked, all water will flood into the other shaft, killing all miners inside. If we block neither shaft, both will be flooded partially, killing 1 miner.
 (1)
We should block neither shaft A nor shaft B.
However, the following also seems acceptable.
 (2)
We should block shaft A if the miners are in shaft A.
 (3)
We should block shaft B if the miners are in shaft B.
 (4)
The miners are either in shaft A or in shaft B.
And (2), (3) together with (4) imply that
 (5)
Either we should block shaft A or we should block shaft B.
The deontic STIT logic proposed in Horty (2001), Kooi and Tamminga (2008), Sun (2011) cannot solve this paradox: Although the inference from (2)–(4) to (5) is not valid in the logic introduced in Sun (2011), both Horty (2001) and Sun (2011) are not capable of predicting (1). In this paper, we develop MADL, which is able to block the inference from (2)–(4) to (5) meanwhile predicts (1)–(4).
3 Deontic STIT logic

strong lifting: Let \(U_1\) and \( U_2\) be two sets of worlds, \(U_1\) is strongly at least as good as \( U_2\) iff \(\forall w\in U_1\), \(\forall v\in U_2\), w is at least as good as v.

optimistic lifting: \(U_1\) is optimistically at least as good as \( U_2\) iff \(\exists w\in U_1\), \(\forall v\in U_2\), w is at least as good as v.

pessimistic lifting: \(U_1\) pessimistically at least as good as \( U_2\) iff \(\forall w\in U_1\), \(\exists v\in U_2\), w is at least as good as v.
Definition 1
 (1)
IndChoice(i) forms a partition of W, for every \(i\in Agent\);
 (2)
given arbitrary \(x_{1}\in IndChoice(1), \ldots , x_{n}\in IndChoice(n)\) and \(Agent=\{1,\ldots ,n\}\), it holds that \(x_{1}\cap \cdots \cap x_{n}\ne \emptyset \);
We use \(w\preceq v\) to represent that w is no better than v and \(w\approx v\) as an abbreviation of \(w\preceq v\) and \(v\preceq w\).
Definition 2
 (1)
there are \(u \in X\) and \(u'\in Y\) such that \(u\preceq u'\).
 (2)
for every \(u\in X\), for every \(u'\in Y\), \(u\preceq u'\).
\(X\prec ^s Y\) is used to denote \(X\preceq ^s Y\) meanwhile \(Y\not \preceq ^s X\).
Definition 3
(Horty (2001)) Let \(H\subseteq Agent\) and T, \(T'\in Choice(H)\). \(T \preceq ^s_{H} T'\) iff for all \(S\in Choice(AgentH)\), \(T\cap S \preceq ^s T'\cap S\).
\(T\preceq ^s_{H} T'\) means that “\(T'\) weakly dominates T.” From a perspective of decision theory, \(T\preceq ^s_{H} T'\) says that whatever other agents do, the result obtained by choosing \(T'\) is no worse than that of choosing T. \(T\prec ^s_{H}T'\) is short for \(T\preceq ^s_{H} T'\) and \(T' \not \preceq ^s_{H} T\). If \(T\prec ^s_{H} T'\), then we say \(T'\) strongly dominates T.
Definition 4
Intuitively, Choice(H / Y) are those choices made by group H which are consistent with Y.
Definition 5
\(T\preceq ^s_{H/Y}T'\) means that “\(T'\) weakly dominates T under the condition of Y.” \(T\prec ^s_{H/Y}T'\), read as “\(T'\) strongly dominates T under the condition of Y,” is short for \(T\preceq ^s_{H/Y}T'\) and \(T'\not \preceq ^s_{H/Y}T\).
Definition 6

\(Optimal^s_{H}\) = {\(T \in Choice(H):\) there is no \(T'\in Choice(H)\) such that \(T\prec ^s_{H} T'\)}.

\(Optimal^s_{H/Y}\) = {\(T \in Choice(H/Y):\) there’s no \(T'\in Choice(H/Y)\) such that \(T\prec ^s_{H/Y}T'\)}.
Definition 7
Here \(\Vert \psi \Vert =\{v\in W: M,v\vDash \psi \}\).
Group H can choose \({\textit{block}}\_A\), \({\textit{block}}\_B\) or \({\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}}\), while other agents can only choose W. All the three choices of group H are optimal by the strong lifting. Therefore, \(Miners, v_1\not \vDash \bigcirc _H ({\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}})\). Therefore, UDL cannot solve the miners paradox.
3.1 Utilitarian deontic logic via pessimistic lifting
With the motivation of solving the miners paradox, we introduce a new logic called pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic (PUDL), in which pessimistic lifting is used instead of strong lifting. We will show that PUDL not only solves the miners paradox but also solves Ross’s paradox and the contrary to duty paradox. We then present an axiomatization for PUDL and generalize PUDL to MADL in the next subsection.
Informally, \({\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}}\) in the miners scenario is the only optimal choice according to the pessimistic lifting. Hence, “we ought to block neither” holds. Moreover, in PUDL both (2) and (3) are true, whereas the inference from (2)(4) to (5) is invalid. Therefore, PUDL is capable of solving the miners paradox. Now, we present these arguments formally.
3.1.1 Language

pessimistic lifting: \(\psi \preceq ^{p} \phi {::=} \square (\phi \Rightarrow \langle \succeq \rangle \psi ) \). Informally, the formula \(\square (\phi \Rightarrow \langle \succeq \rangle \phi ) \) says that every \(\phi \)world is weakly better than some \(\psi \)world.

\(\bigcirc _i \psi {::=} (\lnot \psi \prec ^p [i]\psi ) \wedge \lozenge [i]\psi \). That is to say, agent i ought to STIT \(\psi \) if and only if in the pessimistic sense STIT \(\psi \) is strictly better than \(\lnot \psi \) and it is possible for i to STIT \(\psi \).

\(\bigcirc _i (\psi /\phi ) {::=} \lozenge [i]\psi \wedge ((\lnot \psi \wedge \phi ) \prec ^p ([i] \phi \wedge \psi ))\).
3.1.2 Semantics
We now introduce the semantics of PUDL.
Definition 8
A tuple \(M= ( W, \preceq , \prec , IndChoice, V )\) is a pessimistic utilitarian model if W and IndChoice are the same as in the utilitarian model, \(\preceq \) is a relation over W that represents the social welfare of all agents, \(\preceq \) is reflexive, transitive and connected.^{1} \(\prec \) is a relation over W such that for every \(v,v'\in W\), \(v\prec v'\) iff \(v'\not \preceq v\) meanwhile \(v\preceq v'\).
Let \(R_i\) be a relation such that \((v,v')\in R_i\) if and only if there exists a \(T\in IndChoice(i)\) with \(\{v,v'\}\subseteq T\). The semantics of \(\mathfrak {L}_{pudl}\) is defined as follows:
Definition 9
3.1.3 Solving the miners paradox
We formally describe the miners scenario by a pessimistic utilitarian model. Let \(Miners^p= (W, IndChoice, \preceq , \prec , V)\) such that \(W=\{v_1,\) \(\ldots , v_6\}\), \(IndChoice(i)=\{\{v_1,v_2\},\) \(\{v_3,v_4\},\{v_5,v_6\}\}\), \(IndChoice(j)=\{W\}\) for all \(j\not = i\), \(v_3\approx v_6 \prec v_1\approx v_2 \prec v_4 \approx v_5\), \(V({\textit{in}}\_ A) =\{v_1,v_3,v_5\}\),\(V({\textit{in}}\_B) =\{v_2,v_4,v_6\}\), \(V({\textit{block}}\_ A) =\{v_5, v_6\}\), \(V({\textit{block}}\_ B) =\{v_3, v_4\}\), \(V({\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}}) =\{v_1, v_2\}\).
We know that \(\lnot {\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}}\) is strictly worse than \([i] {\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}}\) according to the pessimistic semantics. Therefore, \(Miners^p\), \(v_1 \vDash \bigcirc _i ({\textit{block}}\_{\textit{neither}})\). Moreover, we have “if the miners are in A, then i ought to block A” because \(\lnot {\textit{block}}\_ A\) is worse than \([i] {\textit{block}}\_A\), given the condition of miners being in A. Therefore, \(Miners^p, v_1 \vDash \bigcirc _i ({\textit{block}}\_A/in\_A)\). Similarly \(Miners^p, v_1 \vDash \bigcirc _i ({\textit{block}}\_ B/in\_B)\). It remains to prove that even if “if the miners are in A, then we ought to block A” and “if the miners are in B, then we ought to block B” are both true, we do not infer that “we ought to block either A or B.” The following proposition justifies such reasoning.
Proposition 1
\(\not \vDash _{pudl} \bigcirc _{i} (\phi /\psi ) \wedge \bigcirc _{i} (\phi / \chi )\Rightarrow \bigcirc _{i} (\phi /(\psi \vee \chi )) \).
3.1.4 Bonus 1: solving the contrary to duty paradox
 (1a)
It ought to be that you go to the party;
 (2a)
It ought to be that if you go, then you tell them you are going;
 (3a)
If you don’t go, you ought not to tell them you are going;
 (4a)
You do not go.
 (a)
\(\bigcirc _i p\)
 (b)
\(\bigcirc _i (p\Rightarrow q)\)
 (c)
\(\bigcirc _i(\lnot q/\lnot p)\)
 (d)
\(\lnot p\)
Example 1
Let \(M=(W,V, IndChoice, \preceq , \prec )\), \(W=\{v_{1},\ldots , v_{4}\}\), \(IndChoice(i)=\{\{v_1\},\{v_2\},\{v_3\},\{v_4\}\}\), \(v_1\prec v_2 \prec v_3 \prec v_4\). \(V(p)=\{v_{3},v_4\}\), \(V(q)=\{v_{1}, v_4\}\). See Fig. 2. In this model, we have all the four formulas \((a)(d)\) are all true in \(v_{1}\).
3.1.5 Bonus 2: solving Ross’ paradox
In UDL, the formula \(\bigcirc _{H} \phi \Rightarrow \bigcirc _{H} (\phi \vee \psi )\) is valid, which means UDL cannot solve Ross’ paradox. On the other hand, PUDL solves Ross’ paradox, as the following proposition shows.Suppose John should send a letter. Since sending the letter implies sending it or burning it, John should send the letter or burn it.
Proposition 2
\(\not \vDash _{pudl} \bigcirc _{i} \phi \Rightarrow \bigcirc _{i} (\phi \vee \psi )\).
3.1.6 Axiomatization of PUDL
 1.
Mutual converse for \([\preceq ]\) and \([\succeq ]\):
\((\psi \Rightarrow [\succeq ]\langle \preceq \rangle \psi ) \wedge (\psi \Rightarrow [\preceq ]\langle \succeq \rangle \psi ) \).
 2.S4.3 for \([\preceq ]\):
 (a)
\([\preceq ](\psi \Rightarrow \phi ) \Rightarrow ([\preceq ]\psi \Rightarrow [\preceq ] \phi )\);
 (b)
\([\preceq ]\psi \Rightarrow [\preceq ][\preceq ]\psi \);
 (c)
\([\preceq ]\psi \Rightarrow \psi \);
 (d)
\(\langle \preceq \rangle \phi \wedge \langle \preceq \rangle \psi \Rightarrow (\langle \preceq \rangle (\psi \wedge \langle \preceq \rangle \phi ) \vee \langle \preceq \rangle (\phi \wedge \langle \preceq \rangle \psi ) \vee \langle \preceq \rangle (\psi \wedge \phi ) )\).
 (a)
 3.
K for \([\prec ]\):
\([\prec ](\psi \Rightarrow \phi ) \Rightarrow ([\prec ]\psi \Rightarrow [\prec ] \phi )\).
 4.Interaction:
 (a)
\([\prec ]\psi \Rightarrow [\preceq ][\prec ]\psi \);
 (b)
\([\prec ]\psi \Rightarrow [\prec ][\preceq ]\psi \);
 (c)
\([\preceq ]([\preceq ]\psi \vee \phi )\wedge [\prec ]\phi \Rightarrow \psi \vee [\preceq ]\phi \).
 (a)
 5.Inclusion:
 (a)
\(\square \psi \Rightarrow [\preceq ]\psi \);
 (b)
\([\preceq ]\psi \Rightarrow [\prec ]\psi \);
 (c)
for \(i\in Agent\), \(\square \psi \Rightarrow [i]\psi \).
 (a)
 6.
Agent independent: \((\lozenge [1]\psi _1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \lozenge [n]\psi _n)\Rightarrow \lozenge ([1]\psi _1 \wedge \cdots \wedge [n]\psi _n)\).
 7.
S5 for \( \square \).
 8.
S5 for [i], \(i\in Agent\).
Theorem 1
\({\varGamma }\vdash _{pudl} \psi \) iff \({\varGamma }\vDash _{pudl} \psi \)
The completeness (righttoleft) can be proved by using a canonical model technique together with Bulldozing (Segerberg 1971), and both are standard technique in modal logic. The proof of soundness (lefttoright) is trivial.
3.2 Multiauthority deontic STIT logic
Now we generalize PUDL to MADL. The main difference between them is that in MADL, deontic modality is interpreted via multiple authorities.
3.2.1 Language

\(\bigcirc ^{j}_i \psi {::=} (\lnot \psi \prec ^j [i]\psi ) \wedge \lozenge [i]\psi \). Intuitively, this formula means that agent i ought to see to it that \(\psi \) according to the normative value of authority j iff \(\lnot \psi \) is strictly worse than seeing to it that \(\psi \) according to the normative value of authority j and it is possible for i to see to it that \(\psi \).

\(\bigcirc ^{j}_i (\psi /\phi ) {::=} ((\lnot \psi \wedge \phi ) \prec ^j ([i]\psi \wedge \phi )) \wedge \lozenge [i]\psi \).

\(F ^{j}_i \psi {::=} \bigcirc ^{j}_i \lnot \psi \). This means according to the normative value of authority j, agent i is forbidden to STIT \(\psi \) iff i is obliged to STIT \(\lnot \psi \).

\(F^{j}_i (\psi /\phi ) {::=} \bigcirc ^{j}_i (\lnot \psi /\phi ) \).

\(P ^{j}_i \psi {::=} \lnot F ^{j}_i \psi \). This means according to the normative value of authority j, agent i is permitted to see to it that \(\psi \) iff i is not forbidden to see to it that \( \psi \).

\(P ^{j}_i(\psi /\phi ) {::=} \lnot F ^{j}_i (\psi /\phi ) \).
3.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of MADL is based on multiauthority STIT model, which is a generalization of PUDL model.
Definition 10
(Multiauthority STIT model) A Multiauthority STIT model \(M= ( W, IndChoice, \preceq _1, \prec _1,\ldots , \preceq _m, \prec _m, V )\) is a tuple where W and IndChoice are the same as in PUDL model, and \(\preceq _j\) is a relation on W indicating the normative standard of authority j. \(\preceq _j\) is required to be reflexive, transitive and connected. \(\prec _j\) is a subrelation of \(\preceq _j\) such that for all \(v,v'\in W\), \(v\prec _j v'\) iff \(v \preceq _j v'\) and \(v'\not \preceq _j v\).
The semantics of \(\mathfrak {L}_{mddl}\) is defined similarly to that of PUDL; here, we only give the crucial cases:
Definition 11
3.2.3 Axiomatization of MADL
The axiomatic system of MADL is obtained by a simply modification of the proof system of PUDL: Simply replace the occurrence of \([\preceq ], [\succeq ]\) and \([\prec ]\) by \([\preceq ^j], [\succeq ^j]\) and \([\prec ^j]\) for each \(j\in Auth\).
Theorem 2
(Soundness and completeness) \({\varGamma }\vdash _{madl} \psi \) iff \({\varGamma }\vDash _{madl} \psi \).
4 Related work
Using logics to handle the problems of specifying and reasoning about the security of information systems started from 1988 by Glasgow and MacEwen (1988). Since then, various types of logic have been used to model inference abilities and specification of security policies. Van Hertum et al. (2016) have recently proposed a multiagent variant of autoepistemic logic, called Distributed Autoepistemic Logic with Inductive Definitions (dAEL(ID)), to be used as a saysbased access control logic. By applying the semantic principles of autoepistemic logic to characterize the saysmodality, dAEL(ID) allows us to derive a statement of the form \(says_{\lnot k} \psi \) on the basis of the observation that k has not issued statements implying \(\psi \). Supporting reasoning about such negated saysstatements allows dAEL(ID) to straightforwardly model access denials, which can hardly be modeled by previous saysbased access control logics.
5 Summary and future work
In this article, we have developed a deontic STIT logic with the possible application to the specification of security policy for intrude detection in the pervasive computing environment. Compared to the existing deontic STIT logics, an advantage of our logic is that it is capable of solving the miners paradox, a logical paradox which recently grabs attentions of logicians, philosophers, linguistists and computer scientists. A complete and sound axiomatization for our logic was developed. Concerning future works, we will study the computational complexity of our logic and perform some case study for the application of our logic to security policies.
Footnotes
 1.
\(\preceq \) is connected if for all \(v,v'\in W\), either \(v\preceq v'\), or \(v'\preceq v.\)
Notes
Acknowledgements
Lirong Qiu has been supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61672553, 61331013). Xin Sun has been supported by the National Science Centre of Poland (BEETHOVEN, UMO2014/15/G/HS1/04514).
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest
Both authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Human and animals participants
This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.
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