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Soft Computing

, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp 1287–1294 | Cite as

Heterogeneous investment in spatial public goods game with mixed strategy

  • Hong Ding
  • Yao Zhang
  • Yizhi Ren
  • Benyun Shi
  • Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Methodologies and Application

Abstract

Understanding and maximizing the effects of heterogeneous investment, particularly in a socially diverse society, on the evolution of cooperation have been the focus of recent research. In the most existing studies, individuals are limited to make binary decisions (i.e., either cooperate or defect). This is unrealistic in many real-world situations. In this paper, we investigate the effect of a heterogeneous investment on the evolution of cooperation in mixed strategy public goods games, wherein individuals have different probability of cooperation. Specifically, players are able to distribute heterogeneous investments into different groups, and they tend to allocate their investment into the group which achieves a higher return on investment (e.g., payoffs). Simulation results show that the formation of cooperative clusters allows cooperative players to resist the exploitation of defective players; subsequently, the cooperation level of the whole population significantly increases. Moreover, the results also show that cooperative clusters become more robust when the investment redistribution decision relies on more recent information. Our study may offer new insights into how strategy diversity promotes the evolutionary of cooperation in realistic situations.

Keywords

Spatial public goods game Mixed strategy Heterogeneous investment 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Authors like to appreciate the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. This work is supported by the National Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61100194, 61402141, 61100039, 61272173 and 61403059) and the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province (Grant No. BK20131277).

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of CyberspaceHangzhou Dianzi UniversityHangzhouChina
  2. 2.School of Computer Science and TechnologyHangzhou Dianzi UniversityHangzhouChina
  3. 3.Key Laboratory of Complex Systems Modeling and Simulation, Ministry of EducationHangzhouChina
  4. 4.Department of Information Systems and Cyber SecurityUniversity of Texas at San AntonioSan AntonioUSA
  5. 5.School of Information Technology and Mathematical SciencesUniversity of South AustraliaAdelaideAustralia

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